In a recent report by the BBC, former North Korean soldiers provided chilling insights about the conditions and experiences of troops now fighting in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Highlighted in the article is one defector, Haneul, who recounts the severe malnutrition and deprivation that characterized his time in the North Korean military. He mentions that in his first month of service, he lost around 10 kilograms, primarily due to a meager diet consisting of cracked corn and moldy cabbage. This troubling narrative is echoed by other defectors who describe nearly their entire battalions exhibiting signs of starvation, necessitating their transfer to recovery facilities for weight gain.
Haneul recalls that while deployed to the frontline as guards along the border with South Korea, the ration of rice was often compromised, being siphoned off by rear units or diluted with sand before reaching the frontline soldiers. Despite being one of the better-fed units—an attempt to prevent defections—Haneul ultimately escaped in 2012, making an audacious crossing through the heavily guarded Demilitarized Zone. His narrative highlights not only the physical hardships of service but also sheds light on the grim realities facing new North Korean military personnel now engaged in combat in Ukraine.
Reports indicate that Pyongyang has dispatched approximately 11,000 troops to aid Russian forces in their attempts to reclaim territory in the Kursk region, which Ukraine had seized during a surprise summer offensive. Recent intelligence from Seoul, Washington, and Kyiv suggests that these North Korean soldiers have begun entering the conflict in substantial numbers, with South Korean officials hypothesizing more than 100 casualties, a number still awaiting verification.
Experts and defectors alike caution that these troops should not be underestimated. Many of the soldiers sent to Ukraine are believed to belong to the elite Storm Corps, a unit reputed for its higher morale, even while lacking critical insights into contemporary warfare strategies. Lee Hyun Seung, a former trainer for North Korea’s special forces, explains that the Storm Corps consists of younger, athletic individuals who have undergone combat training involving techniques such as martial arts and weapon-making from everyday objects. However, these combatants are still grappling with malnutrition, which has raised concerns regarding their effectiveness in a foreign conflict.
Haneul’s observations of videos showcasing the current troops reveal a stark difference between reality and the portrayal of North Korean soldiers in state propaganda, often depicted as robust and thrillingly capable. Actual training experiences, as he recalled, confirm minimal live-fire exposure, with soldiers barely engaging in extensive combat drills. The only engagement he experienced during his service involved a cautious decision not to fire upon a hungry farmer seeking food in the DMZ.
The realities of the military training environment have reportedly changed little since Haneul’s time, with defectors like Ryu Seonghyun sharing accounts of enduring extreme duress during their military tenure. Soldiers are often isolated in mountainous training zones for days, urged to rely on minimal provisions, a method framed as survival training. Here, the question arises about the adaptability of these troops to combat in the unfamiliar flat terrains of Kursk.
Storm Corps soldiers are not classified as a primary fighting force in the North Korean military hierarchy; their recruitment seeks individuals capable of infiltrating enemy lines and instigating chaos. However, Kim Jong Un’s need for special operation troops arises from the fact that regular soldiers are typically occupied with non-combat tasks such as agriculture or construction. Therefore, deploying these elite but underfed troops reflects a calculated move, aiming to present some semblance of combat capability to Russia.
Despite the evident challenges facing them, defectors believe that the strong loyalty instilled by the North Korean government will foster a compelling fighting spirit among these soldiers. Remarkably, many of these troops hail from working-class backgrounds, likely imbued with a fierce obedience to Kim’s regime, as described by Haneul. Intense ideological indoctrination occurs daily to ensure their mental readiness for combat.
Although the situation is precarious and crisscrossed with formidable challenges, there lies an understanding that defectors and military experts advocate against simply regarding these soldiers as mere “cannon fodder.” Their extensive indoctrination, loyalty to the regime, and life experiences prepare them to fight fiercely and adapt swiftly. Chun In-bum, a former commander of South Korea’s special forces, emphasizes that though they lack resources, dismissing their capabilities is perilous.
Importantly, while approximately 11,000 North Korean troops may not fundamentally alter the course of the ongoing war—given Russia’s staggering casualty rates—it remains plausible that this could be the initial deployment in a larger rotation. Experts suggest that if necessary, Pyongyang could send anywhere from 60,000 to 100,000 troops in total, augmenting Russia’s military presence and potentially increasing effectiveness on their part.
In the realm of potential defection, communication barriers and strict orders against escape complicate scenarios. North Korean soldiers are trained to view capture as disgraceful,
